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Abstract 
This paper studies the roommate problem introduced by Gale and Shapley 
(1962) under weak preferences. We aim at strengthening Chung's (2000) no 
odd rings" condition for the existence of stable matchings and the convergence 
of random-paths-to-stability. In a restricted domain of preference profiles, we 
modify and extend Tan's (1991) stable partition structure to the case with weak 
preferences. We show that "no odd party" in a "stable partition" is a sufficient 
condition for the existence of stable matchings. We also show that "no odd 
party" in a "semi-stable partition" is both necessary and sufficient condition for 
the random path to converge to a stable roommate matching, that is, when we 
start with any initially unstable matching, we can always find a finite sequence 
of blocking pairs leading to a stable matching. Moreover, we present some 
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1 Introduction 
This paper studies the structure of the roommate problem under the case of 
weak preferences. The roommate problem is a generalization of the marriage 
problem. Both problems are introduced in the classic paper by Gale and Shapley 
(1962). It is well-known that the marriage problem is a two-sided matching 
problem, that is, we concern the matching between a set of men and a set 
of women in the marriage market. The roommate problem generalizes it in 
the sense that the two-sided nature of the market is taken away. So there is 
only one set of agents, and a matching in this case is a rule of assignment 
that pairs up the agents within this set. Besides this difference, the theory of 
two-sided marriage matching often generates practical implications on how to 
design a centralized mechanism in solving real-world matchings problem, say for 
medical-intern matching program, and recently for school choices ^ Given the 
mathematical nature of the roommate problem, economists are often interested 
in its theoretical structure instead of the empirical implications^. 
Two theoretical issues are studied in the marriage problem. The first issue 
concerns the existence of stable matchings. Stable matching is a solution concept 
for the matching game. A matching is said to be stable if no two agents who are 
not matched together prefer each other to their own current partner. If there 
is such a pair, they will negotiate privately and disobey the rule of assignment. 
In this sense, we say that they block the matching. Gale and Shapley (1962) 
iSee Roth (1984,2002,2007), Roth and Peranson (1999)，Sonmez and Abdulkadiroglu 
(2003) 
2 One potential application of the theory of roommate matching is to study the merger of 
firms. 
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prove that every instance of marriage problem admits a stable matching, and 
their proof adopts the famous "deferred acceptance algorithm". 
The second issue addressed is the convergence of random-paths-to-stability. 
By a random path, we mean a finite sequence of matchings. Each matching in 
this sequence except the first is obtained by satisfying a blocking pair of the 
preceding matching. We can imagine a random path as matchings generated 
by a decentralized market. In the market, we don't assign partners to agents, 
rather we let the agents find their partner freely. If an agent is not satisfied 
with the current matching, and if in case he/she can find a mate who will 
go with him/her, then this will block the current matching and generate a 
new one. Continue in this fashion, we will obtain a sequence of matchings 
as mentioned above. If this decentralized negotiation process leads to a stable 
matching finally, we say that the random path converges. Roth and Vande-Vate 
(1990) study the random path in the marriage problem, and show that for any 
initial matching, the random path converges with probability one to a stable 
matching. 
Some game theorists and mathematicians have studied the corresponding 
theoretical issues in the roommate problem with strict preferences. As shown in 
Gale and Shapley (1962)，the nonexistence of solution in the roommate problem 
is caused by a cyclic pattern of preference. This cyclic pattern is called an 
"odd ring". Consider a three-agent example, if 1 prefers 2 to 3, 2 prefers 3 
to 1, and 3 prefers 1 to 2，then we have an odd ring of size 3. Attempts 
have been made to establish relationship between odd rings and the existence 
of solution. In particular, in roommate problem with strict preferences, Tan 
(1991) characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition called "no odd party" 
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condition under which stable roommate matchings exist. By an "odd party"，we 
mean an odd ring with an additional restriction that agents inside the odd ring 
does not form a blocking pair with agents outside the ring. Loosely speaking, 
an odd party is thus an "unbreakable" odd ring and a more general structure. 
Moreover, "no odd party" essentially rules out the trouble-making effect of odd 
rings and hence guarantees the existence of solutions. He also genealizes the 
concept of stable matching and defines a structure called "stable partition" 
,which is useful in characterizing the no odd party condition. By a "stable 
partition", we mean a partition of the set of agents into smaller groups of 
agents, with the additional condition that blocking pair across groups does not 
exist. Consider an example of putting five students in a dorm, with three of 
them living in a big room and the remaining two in a small room. This is a 
partition. If no two students who are not roommate prefer living with each 
other than their current roommate, then such a "partition" is called "stable". 
On the other hand, stable matching only allows a group of size two at most 
while stable partition does not restrict the size of partition sets. Hence the 
latter concept is more general and has a closer linkage with roommate problem 
than marriage problem as room size could vary in reality. 
Diamantoudi et al. (2004) prove that any random paths must be conver-
gent in strict preferences case without the need of putting any restriction on 
preference profiles, and suggest that the existence of stable matchings itself 
guarantees the convergence of random-paths-to-stability. Unlike the difference 
of the existence result between the marriage and the roommate problem, their 
main result implies convergence is not caused by the two-sided nature of the 
matching market. 
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Chung (2000) is the first to study the roommate problem with weak prefer-
ences in economics. He shows that "no odd ring" is sufficient for both existence 
and convergence. Although the "no odd ring" condition has immediate eco-
nomic interpretation and applications in social choice theory, the condition by 
itself is too strong as it does not consider the relationship of agents in and out-
side the ring. We can easily find preference profiles which contain an odd ring 
and yet stable matching exists. 
In this paper, we aim at strengthening Chung's "no odd ring" condition. 
Also we try to find out whether results in Tan and Diamantoudi et al. extend 
naturely to weak preference profiles. In Tan's algorithmic analysis, the concept 
of stable partition is not an explicit restriction on preference profile. Extending 
it t o the rooiriinate problem with weak preferences, we define two versions of 
stable partition in terms of preference relations in the roommate problem, one 
for studying existence (we continue to call it "stable partition") and the other 
for studying convergence (we call it "semi-stable partition"). Focusing on pref-
erence profiles that contain a unique odd ring, we try to provide a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of stable matching and for the convergence 
of randorn-paths-tostability, in the form of restrictions on preference profiles. 
In this restricted domain, we have shown that "no odd party" in a stable par-
tition is sufficient for existence and "no odd party" in a semi-stable partition 
is both necessary and sufficient for convergence. Our study fill the gap of the 
roommate literature, as the relevant analysis of the roommate problem consid-
ers mostly the case of strict preferences as in Tan (1991) and Diamantoudi et 
al. (2004). Our results will be parallel to them in the case of weak preferences. 
Nevertheless, more general results are yet to be obtained since we have 
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assumed unique and strict odd ring throughout the research. By adding such 
restriction, we are able to look at the structure of the problem more clearly 
and establish some tentative results. Furthermore, we include examples that 
are worked out during the research. Some examples illustrate the difficulty 
of extending the structure of stable partition to weak preferences. We believe 
our results and examples will serve as a stepping stone for us to generalize our 
main results. We attempt to answer some theoretical questions in this research 
and try to fill the gap of literature. Although the target we set is high and 
the present work is incomplete, we still find the work fruitful as the tentative 
results and examples generated during the research process surely will lay the 
foundation for illuminating a new direction of future work. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
literature in marriage and roommate matching. Section 3 outlines the formal 
model of roommate matching. Section 4 studies the condition for the existence 
of stable roommate matchings. Section 5 investigates whether random paths 
converge in roommate problem. The last section concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
Marriage problem has been studied extensively in the matching literature. Gale 
and Shapley (1962) show that stable matchings exist in every instance of mar-
riage problem by adopting the "deferred acceptance algorithm". Roth and 
Vande Vate (1990) address the issue of random-paths-to-stability, that is, whether 
there exists a finite sequence of successive blocking pairs leading to a stable 
matching in the absence of a centralized matching procedure. They construct 
a convergence path to a stable matching in the marriage market. Development 
and pratice of two-sided matchin theory are nicely documented in Kunth (1976), 
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and recently in Roth (2007). 
The related issues of the roommate problem are investigated in the literature 
in the case of strict preferences. Tan (1991) obtains a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of stable roommate matchings. He defines a structure 
called "stable partition", which is a partition of the agents into three different 
ordered sets, a singleton, a mutually acceptable pairs, or an odd party, together 
with stability condition satisfied between sets and within each set. More pre-
cisely, an odd party is an odd number of agents with cyclic pattern of preference, 
for example, if agent 1 prefers agent 2 to agent 3, agent 2 prefers agent 3 to 
agent 1, and agent 3 prefers agent 1 to agent 2, then the agents constitute an 
odd party of size 3. Tan proves that every instance of roommate problem admits 
at least one stable partition and there exists stable roommate matching if and 
only if there is "no odd party". 
Diamantoiidi et al.(2004) proves the convergence of random-paths-to-stability 
for the roommate problem. By fixing a stable matching, they generate a path to 
stability that avoids cyclicity. The path gives a sequence of matchings obtained 
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by satisfying an increasing number of blocking pairs common with pairs of the 
matching fixed until a stable matching is reached. 
In the instance with no stable matching, Tan (1990) shows the existence 
of maximum stable matchings, i.e., a maximum number of disjoint pairs of 
agents such that these pairs are stable among themselves. Following this notion, 
Inarra et al. (2007) proves the convergence of Roth and Vande Vate process to 
maximum stable matching (Inarra et al. calls it P-stable matching). 
In weak preferences case, Chung (2000) identifies a condition called "no odd 
ring" that is sufficient for both existence of stable roommate matchings and 
convergence of random-paths-to-stability. The no odd ring condition allows 
Chung to label each agent as either a man or woman, hence by Roth and Vande 
Vate process, he can show that random paths converge to stable matchings. 
Chung's "no odd ring" condition is by itself stronger than Tan's "no odd 
party" condition, since odd party is an odd ring plus an additional stability 
condition. This stability condition guarantees that odd ring is not broken even 
if some agents living outside the ring propose to agents in ring. Hence with 
the presence of odd rings, an instance of roommate problem still admits stable 
matching if the stability condition is not satisfied, i.e., odd rings can be broken. 
Following this logic, odd ring is not a problem for convergence of random paths 
for strict preference as Diamantoudi et al. result suggests that existence of 
convergence path to stability is not generated by two-sided structure of the 
market but by existence of stable matching itself. Therefore, it is impossible for 
us to have an instance for roommate problem, which admits stable matching 
and at the same time we can construct a cyclic of blocking pairs which never 
converge. 
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3 The Roommate Problem 
Let N be the set of agents, and let i = 1,2,3，... index typical agents in N. 
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation ^^ defined over 
the set of agents N. We write 1 : 2 ^ 3 to denote that 1 weakly prefers 2 to 3. 
If 1 strictly prefers 2 to 3, we write 1 : 2 ：^  3. If 1 is indifferent between 2 to 3, 
we write 1 : 2 � 3 . We say 2 is "unacceptable" to 1 if 1 strictly prefers living 
alone than having 2 as roommate, i.e., 1 : 1 2. A preference profile,匕 is a 
collection of preference relations of all agents, i.e., {hi)ieN-
A "matching" is an assignment of roommates. In every possible matching, 
each agent is assigned at most one roommate. An agent lives alone if he is not 
assigned any roommate, we say that he is "single". 
Definition 1. A "matching" /i is a one-toone mapping from N onto N such 
that for all {i,j} C N, ^{i) = j if and only if = i. i is "single" under 
matching if = i. 
A matching satisfies "individual rationality" if no agent is assigned an unac-
ceptable roommate to him. Two agents {z, j } "block" a matching fi if they are 
not assigned as roommates to each other under matching /u but both prefers 
having each other than the current partner as roommate. If this is the case, 
{z, j } have incentive to get together and leave the assigned roommate under /i. 
We say that {i,j} is a blocking pair. 
Definition 2. A pair of agents {z, j } C N, possibly i = j , "block" /x if z : j 
� and j //,(j). 
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When there is no pair of agents under an individually rational matching (i can 
block II itself, we say that matching /i is a "stable matching". An instance of 
"roommate problem" is defined by a collection of agents N and preference profile 
匕 We are interested in the characteristics of stable matchings. Yet, Gale and 
Shapley (1962) shows that stable matchings may not exist in the roommates 
problem. An example is as follows: 
Example 1. Consider a roomates problem with N = {1,2,3} , and the follow-
ing preference profile: 
1 : 2 ^ 3 ^ 1 
2 : 3 — 1 — 2 
3 : 1 2 ^ 3 
There are no stable matchings for this preference profile. To see this, suppose 
1 and 2 are roommates under ji. Then 3 can propose to 2 and 2 would leave 1 
so that {2,3} forms a blocking pair of /i. Given this structure of preference, the 
above arugment is true for any other pair of roommates. 
In this paper, we would like to find out the restrictions on preference pro-
file such that stable matchings exist. The particular pattern of preference in 
example 1 which causes problem is as follows. 
Definition 3. A "ring" is an ordered subset of agents ( 1 , 2 , k ) , with /c > 3, 
such that (subscript modulo k) 
z : 2 + 1 2 - 1 ^ z, for odd \ <i <k 
2 : z + 1 ^ z — 1 b i, for even 2, 1 < z < /c 
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Remark Definition 3 is adopted from Chung (2000). Notice that for an odd 
agent, he strictly prefers i + 1 to z — 1, while this is not the case for even agent. 
We found that this definition is sufficient for Chung to prove his main result. 
For generalization, requiring z : z + 1 ^ 2 - 1 ^ i, for all i, 1 < z < A; do not 
affect the application of Chung's theorem. 
Definition 4. An "odd ring" is a ring (1，2,…，k) such that k is odd. A "weak 
ring" is an odd ring with preference structure defined in definition 3. If the 
preferences are all strict in definition 3，we call the odd ring a "strict ring". 
Chung (2000) proves that "no odd ring" is a sufficient condition for the existence 
of stable matching. In the special case of strict preference, Tan (1991) proves 
that every instance of roommate problem has at least one "stable partition". A 
stable partition is a partition of the set of agents, N = UkAk, such that (1) every 
partition set, A = {1,2,..., n}, is either a singleton, a pair of mutually acceptable 
agents, or corresponds to a strict ring, and (2) for any i E Ak and j G Ak' 
(possibly Ak = A^') such that AkA' are not singleton set, i : j y i — 1 j : 
j — 1 y i. A ring with condition (2) satisfied is called an "odd party". Tan's 
(1991) necessary and sufficient condition states that stable matching exists if 
and only if there is "no odd party" contained in the preference profile, i.e., every 
partition set is either a signleton or a mutually acceptable pair. 
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4 The Existence of Stable Matchings 
In this section, we define the structure of stable partition and study the exis-
tence of stable matchings. The roommate problem becomes interesting with the 
presence of odd rings. In weak preferences case, Chung has proved that no weak 
odd ring is sufficient for the existence of stable matchings, yet the converse of 
his theorem is not true as shown by example 2 in Chung (2000)3. In a sense his 
theorem is too strong and incomplete. It is natural to ask what the necessary 
condition for the existence of stable matchings is and how to rela:K Chung's "no 
weak odd ring" condition for existence. Given the complexity of the problem 
at hand, we find it fruitful to assume that the preference profile contains only a 
unique strict ring. By considering this restricted domain of preference profile, 
we are able to look at the nature of the problem more clearly. 
Tan (1991) defines the structure of "stable partition", which generalizes the 
concept of stable matching. We do it similarly in case of weak preferences 
but we define them in terms of preference relation. We define two versions of 
stable partition: One version for existence, which we call "stable partition", and 
another version for convergence, which we call "semi-stable partition". They 
will serve as the building blocks of our theory. 
Definition 5a. (For existence) A "stable partition" is a partition, N = 
UfcAfc, with k as some finite number, such that (1) every partition set, Ak = 
{1,2，..., n}, is either a singleton, a pair of mutually acceptable agents, or cor-
responds to a strict ring, and (2) for any i e Ak and j G A^', with Ak,Ak' are 
^The example contains four agents N 二 {1,2,3,4}，with (1,2,3) forms an odd ring. 4 
strictly prefers 1 to living alone and does not want to live with any other agents. 1 strictly 
prefers 4 to 2 and 3. There is an odd ring but a stable matching is {(1,4), (2,3)} 
11 
not singleton set and possibly Ak = Ak' such that, 
z : j ^ i - 1 j : j - 1 y i. 
A ring with condition (2) satisfied is called an "odd party". 
Definition 5b. (For convergence) A "semi-stable partition" is a partition, 
N = UfcAfc, with k as some finite number, such that (1) every partition set, 
Ak = {1,2,…，n}，is either a singleton, a pair of mutually acceptable agents, or 
corresponds to a strict ring, and (2) for any i E A^ and j e A^, with Ak,Ak' 
are not singleton set and possibly Ak = A^；', such that 
i ： j y i — 1 => j : j — i t i. 
A ring with condition (2) satisfied is called an "odd party". 
Both definitions are natural generalization of the structure of stable partition 
as defined in Tan (1990). Wo add indifference relation to the condition (2) in 
both versions. To demonstrate the difference, we present the following example: 
Example 2. Consider N = {1,2,3,4,5} and weak preference profile ^ ： 
1: 2 ^ 4 b 3 1 
2： 3 ^  1 ^  2 ^  .. 
3: 1 2 3 ^ .. 
4: 5 � 1 .. 
5: 4 ^ 5 ^ 
In this example, PI = {(1,2,3), (4,5)} is a semi-stable partition but not a stable 
partition. As 1 : 4 ^ 3 and 4 : 5 ~ 1, this satisfies condition (2) in definition 
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5b. but not 5a. P2 = {(1,4), (2，3), 5} is both stable and semi-stable partition. 
From condition (2), we can see that if a partition is stable, then it must be 
semi-stable. 
It is easy to show that a weak preference profile admits stable matchings if 
and only if there is a corresponding strict preference profile which admits stable 
matchings obtained by breaking the ties. Using the terms in Tan (1991), a weak 
preference profile does not admit stable matchings if and only if every one of its 
tie-breaking versions contains at least one "odd party" in the "stable partition". 
We generalize this idea by requiring that the "odd party" is contained in all tie-
breaking versions. The intuition is that by random tie-breaking, we can destroy 
some odd rings, but if there is an odd ring containing in every tie-breaking 
versions, it means that no matter how we break the ties, that common ring is 
still there. Thus by Tan's result, the original weak preference profile does not 
admit any stable matchings. Following this line of reasoning, we conjectured 
that a weak preference profile does not admit stable matchings if and only if all 
of its tie-breaking versions share at least one common odd-party. However, the 
following example illustrates that the "only if" part of our earlier conjecture 
was wrong. 
Example 3. Consider N = {1,2,3,4,5} and weak preference profile 匕： 
1: 2 >^5 � 3 
2: 3 ^ 1 ^ .. 
3: 4 2 � 1 
4: 5 3 ^ .. 
5: 1 4 ^ .. 
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There does not exist any stable roommate matching in this preference profile. 
Since in any stable matching, there must be one agent left single, and this agent 
could propose to the guy who likes him most, and hence they would form a 
blocking pair. This holds for any agent. 
There are four ways to break the ties. They do not share any common odd 
party and yet P does not admit any stable matching. As a result, sharing a 
common odd party is not necessary for the non-existence of solution. See Table 
1 below for details. 
1: 2 5 ^ 3 1: 2 ^ 5 ^ 3 
2: 3 1 ^ .. 2: 3 — 1 .. 
3： 4 ^  2 1 3： Ay ly 2 
4: 5 ^ 3 ^ .. 4: 5 ^ 3 ^ .. 
5: 5: 
Pi : odd party: {1,2’ 3，4，5} P2 ： odd party: {1,2,3,4’ 5} 
1: 2 ^  3 ：^  5 1: 2 3 ^  5 
2: 3 ^  1 .. 2： 3 1 .. 
3: Ay 2yl 3： 4 1 ^  2 
4: 5 ：^  3 .. 4: 
5: 1 ^ 4 .. 5: 1 4 ^ . 
P3 : odd party: {1，2’ 3,4，5} P4 : stable partition: {(1,2,3), (4，5)} 
Table 1: Stable partitions 
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Nevertheless, from the definition of stable partition, it is obvious that no 
odd party is a sufficient condition for stable matchings. Following Tan (1991), 
we state and prove the theorem at below. 
Theorem 1 If a weak preference profile does not contain any odd party in a 
stable partition (definition 5a), tfien it admits stable matching. 
We prove this contrapositively, that is, we show that if the instance of roommate 
problem does not admit any stable matching, and if there is a strict ring, then 
the ring is indeed an odd party according to defintiion 5a. This is done by 
proving the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 Suppose (i) an instance of roommate problem does not admit 
any stable matchings, and assume (ii) A = {ai，0^2, • • •, a-n} is the only odd ring 
in the instance and (in) B = N — {ai, a2,..., an} has a unique stable matching 
fji, then A and B together form a stable partition (using definition 5a). 
Proof See appendix 
Remark The appendix contains two concrete examples showing the idea of the 
above proposition. We consider ywo = {(1,2,3), (4, 5), (6,7), (8,9), 10,11,12} 
with R = (1,2,3) as the unique odd ring and the remaining agents forms a 
unique stable matching. The first example considers the case with single crossing 
pair while the second one is about multiple crossing pairs. These examples are 
obtained when we were adopting the prove proposition 1. 
The intution of proposition 1 goes as follows: Given some partition sets of 
agents, we argue that if they do not form a stable matching, then they form a 
stable partition. Note that the unique odd ring A is a partition set and the stable 
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matching restricted to, B, the set of odd-ring-free agents contains some partition 
sets of size one or two. Putting them together, if there is no more blocking pair 
across A and B, obviously A and B form a stable partition. However if there 
is such a crossing pair, it will initiate a sequence of finite matchings leading to 
a stable matching because the crossing pair must involve an agent in A, that 
is, the odd ring is broken and loses its trouble-making ability. Since we assume 
that no stable matching exists, therefore, crossing pair should not appear and 
A is not broken by agent in B. In other words, A is an odd party. This verifies 
theorem 1 as no odd party implies the odd ring could be broken in some ways. 
The odd ring loses its effect and the existence of solution is guaranteed. 
With proposition 1 proved in the unique strict ring domain, theorem 1 still 
holds when there is a unique ring. Our theorem is more general and powerful 
than Chung's main theorem if we can successfully generalize it to multiple rings. 
Since no odd party includes no odd ring as a special case, our condition is weaker 
and our theorem implies Chung's theorem. In this sense, we have obtained a 
more general characterization of the existence condition. 
We cannot establish the converse of the theorem at this moment yet. Since 
there is a more fundamental problem to deal with. In case of strict preferences, 
Tan (1991) has shown that every stable partition contains the same odd parties. 
Yet in weak preferences, an odd party may disappear if we specify different stable 
partitions. Thus, our existence result is sensitive to the specifications of stable 
partitions. Example 4 below gives a concrete example to this point: two stable 
patitions may contain different odd sets. 
Example 4. Consider N 二 {1,2，3，4, 5,6} with the following preferences: 
1 : 2 4 3 1 
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2 ： 3 ^  1 2 .. 
5 : 4 � 
6 : 5 — 6— 
PI = {(1,2,3)，（4’ 5), 6} and P2 = {(1,4), (2,3), (5,6)} are stable partitions. 
PI contains odd ring (1,2，3) but the ring is broken under partition P2 and P2 
itself is a stable matching. Note that PI does not converge to P2 in the sense 
of random-paths-to-stability. 
This example suggests that our primitive definition for stable partition has 
to be modified. If we take away the odd ring (1,2,3) in the example, we are 
left with agents {4,5,6}. This restricted set of agents, which is odd-ring-free^, 
admits two stable matchings: "a = {(4,5), 6} and = {4, (5,6)}. PI is 
obtained by putting the odd ring (1,2,3) and /ia together. P2 is obtained by 
putting the odd ring (1,2,3) and fib together with 4 blocks with 1. We present 
one more example. 
Example 5. Consider N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} with the following preferences: 
2 : 3 ^ 1 ^ 2； ^ . . 
3 : 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ) - . . 
4We will use this term repeatedly. In general, for an instance of roommate problem with 
agents N = AU D, where A is the unique odd ring, then D is the set of odd-ring-free agents. 
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5 : 4 ^ 7 ^ 5； ^ . . 
In this preference profile, R = (1,2,3) is the unique odd ring. There are two 
stable matchings contained in the set of odd-ring-free agents, namely [ic = 
{(4, 5), (6，7)} and fid = {(4,6), (5，7)}. In fact, it is easy to see that (4,5’ 6’ 7) is 
an even ring and we can think of {4, 7} as men and {5,6} as women, that's why 
there are two stable matchings. Notice that P3 = {(1, 2,3), (4，6), (5,7)} is a sta-
ble partition. If we start with matching P4 = {(1,2,3)，（4,5), (6,7)}’ then it will 
converge to P3 according to the following path: P4->{(1,4), (2，3), 5，(6,7)}— 
{(1,4)，(2，3)，6，(5, 7 ) } - .P3 = {(1, 2，3), (4,6), (5’ 7)}. 
As suggested by the above two examples, there seem to be two ways to revise 
the definition of stable partition. We examine these two methods in turn. 
The first way is to require only one of the stable matching restricted to the 
set of odd-ring-free agents to satisfy the condition for stable partition with the 
odd ring. Using this method, both PI and P2 in example 4 are stable partitions, 
yet PI does not converge to the unique stable matching P2. Moreover, both a 
stable partition and a stable matching appears in one preference profile. Hence 
it becomes ambiguous to say a stable matching exists. In example 5, P3 is a 
stable partition while m is not. P4 converges to P3. The advantage of the first 
modification is that it conforms to our intuition that there is no stable matching 
with the presence of odd party as shown in P3. However, the drawback is that 
it leads to the ambiguous interpretation of example 4. To tackle this problem, 
we come up with the second modification. 
The second modification is to claim that agents form a stable partition if all 
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of the stable matchings restricted to the set of odd-ring-free agents satisfy the 
condition for stable partition with the unique odd ring. Under this modification, 
preference profile in example 4 admits a unique stable matching P2 because 
when we put the odd ring (1，2,3) and stable matching = {4’（5，6)} together, 
(1,4) forms a blocking pair and hence violates the stable partition condition. 
In this case, we can unambiguously claim that there is no odd party as the 
unique odd ring is broken by (1,4) and agents do not form a stable partition. 
At the same time a stable matching exists. However, by the same token, odd 
ring (1, 2,3) and /Uc = {(4，5), (6,7)} in example 5 do not satisfy the requirement 
of the second modification as (1,4) forms a blocking pair. Hence the trouble is 
neither stable partition nor stable matching exists. This is not what we want. 
The ways to reconcile different methods of redefining stable partition still have 
to be studied in the future. 
Another issue associated with theorem 1 is that we have to show that we 
can find a stable partition for a given weak preference profile. Tan (1991) has 
proved that every strict preference profile contains at least one stable partition 
by proving an algorithm. We want to bypass the algorithm and reinterpret the 
structure of stable partition. 
Consider a weak preference profile containing odd rings. Let there be a single 
odd ring at the moment. A stable partition in this case is just an odd party 
together with some sets containing one or two agents. Then we can decompose 
all agents in two sets, one contains agents forming an odd ring, the other contains 
agents for which there is no odd ring. The later set admits stable matchings by 
Chung's result. The stable matchings in this restricted set may not be unique. 
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If there are no "crossing pairs''^ across the decomposed sets, then they form a 
stable partition. Or if there are crossing pairs, we would like to show that the 
sequence of blocking pairs would eventually contradict the stability of matching 
restricted to the set of odd-ring-free agents. Yet from example 4, we can see 
that the argiiiiiciit above may not allow us to find all stable partitions. 
Theorem 2 For a given weak preference profile, there exists at least one stable 
partition (definition 5a). 
This is hard to prove in general. We proceed by considering a simpler case, 
which helps us to gain some idea about the structure of the problem. 
First, we restrict attention to an example with strict preferences in set of 
agents which does not contain odd ring. To fix idea, consider a strict odd ring 
R and a set of odd-ring free agents with weak preferences I weak- By theorem 
1, I weak admits a set of stable matchings M = {PI,/I2，…，"A：}. Obviously by 
breaking the ties in I weak, we obtain I strict, i.e., a set of odd-ring free agents with 
strict preferences, which has a set of stable matchings M C M as some new 
blocking pairs will arise and destroy some stable matchings in M. We provide 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 Pick a stable matching /i G M for I strict • If RU I strict form 
a stable partition under strict preferences, then the same matching fi for I^eak 
form a stable partition with R U Iweak under weak preferences. 
The proposition outlines the relationship between stable partition with strict 
and weak preferences. Basically weak preferences is obtained by adding ties to 
^By a crossing pair, we mean a blocking pair with one agent coming from the one and the 
other corning from the set of odd-ring-free agent. 
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strict relations. Note that adding ties does not cause any new blocking pair. 
As a result including indifference does not affect the stability of a partition in a 
strict preferences domain. That is why the same partition is stable under weak 
preferences in the proposition. The claim follows directly from the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1 Let P be a weak preference profile and admits a stable matching fi, 
then there is a tie-breaking version P of P such that fi is stable under P. 
Proof Note that a new blocking pairs must involve the agents who are indiffer-
ent between their current roommate and some other agents. Let for each i E N, 
define Xi = {x^ ： i : M(而)〜工fc}. Construct a tie-breaking version by letting 
i : fi{xi) >- Xk, Vxfc G Xi and Vi G N. It is obvious that no new blocking pairs 
will form and block • 
The intuition of proposition 1 is that, a stable partition is in fact a set of odd 
rings together with a stable matching, with stability condition over partition 
sets satisfied. If this is indeed the case, then if we put an odd ring and a stable 
matching together, and if there is no crossing pair, then they should form a 
stable partition. Proposition 2 shows that this is indeed the case. Theorem 1 
shows that if there is no odd party, then there exists a stable matching and 
this stable matching is essentially a stable partition. And in case with a unique 
odd ring of size n, proposition 2 shows that stable partition does exist. Hence 
theorem 1 and proposition 2 together justify the existence of stable partition. 
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5 Random Paths to Stability 
This section studies the convergence property of stable matching. We will show 
that random paths converge under the no odd party condition, i.e., when we 
start with an initially unstable matching, we can always find a finite sequence 
of matchings such that the sequence converges to a stable roommate matching 
with probability one. This convergence result supports the use of stable room-
mate matching as a solution concept in the roommate problem. Since Chung 
(2000) proves that no odd ring is sufficient for convergence in the case of weak 
proference, and by definition, no odd party does not imply there is no odd ring, 
it would be interesting to find out whether random paths converges with the 
presence of odd ring and yet there is no odd party. We still restrict our attention 
to the domain of strict and unique odd ring in this section. 
It is obvious that when the roommate problem does not admit any stable 
matching, then random paths have no where to converge. Since Diamantoudi 
et al. results suggest that the existence of stable matching itself is a sufficient 
condition for the convergence of random path, but in the case of weak prefer-
ences, this result breaks down as it is possible to find a preference profile in 
which stable matching exists and yet any random path is nonconvergent. 
Example 6. Consider iV = {1,2,3,4} and weak preference profile ^ ： 
1 : 4 ^ 2 ^ 3 1 
3 : 1 2 3 ^ 4 
4 : 1 � 4 > 
Note that fig = {(1,4), (2,3)} is the unique stable matching. Starting with an 
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arbitrary unstable matching = {4, (1’ 2), 3}, then no random path originated 
from jLQ will converge to (is as the path must be trapped in the endless cycle of 
ring (1,2,3). 
The above example suggests that the cause of the existence and nonconver-
gence property of weak preferences roommate problem is the presence of ties. 
To formalize, we introduce some notations. 
Definition 6. Suppose {z, j } C N block a matching ji. A new matching / / is 
obtained by "satisfying the blocking pair" {i, j } if (1) j = " ‘ � and i = jjf (J), 
(2) i ^ z = fj,{i) implies fi'[z) = z, and j ^ z = /i{j) implies / / (z) = z, and (3) 
W e TV - { z， j . ’ " � ’ / z ( j ) }， " ' � 
Definition 7. If for any initial individually rational matching /z, there exists 
a finite sequence of iiiatchings (//i,..., fik), such that fii = /./,’ for each n = 
1 , k — 1, there is a blocking pair of f-in such that is obtained from iii by 
"satisfying the blocking pair" of "n, and [ik is stable, then we call such a finite 
sequence of matchings a "path to stability". 
In principle, given a matching, there are a lot of blockings pairs. When we 
choose blocking pair randomly, there could be different "paths to stability" 
even if the starting point fii and the end point /ijt (the stable matching) are the 
same for these different sequences of matchings (/ii, ...，fik). We call the sequence 
of matchings obtained by choosing blocking pairs randomly as a "random path 
to stability". As long as there exists such a convergent and finite sequence of 
matchings, and each blocking pair is chosen with positive probability, following 
a Markov-chain argument, we say that the random path converges to a stable 
matching with probability one. 
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The main result for this section is the following theorem: 
Theorem 3 Suppose there is a unique strict odd ring. For any initial unstable 
matching, there exists random path which converges to a stable matching with 
probability one if and only if the roommate problem contains no odd party in a 
scrrii-stable partition (according to definition 5b). 
The intuition of the theorem is like this. If there is no odd party, odd ring 
could be broken in some ways. So no matter which initial matching we start 
with, we can always find a sequence of matchings that breaks the odd ring. In 
this way, the sequence of matchings will lead to a stable one. Otherwise, if odd 
party exists, the sequence of matchings might be trapped inside the odd ring 
and becomes nonconvergent. 
The idea of the proof is as follows: 
"Only if" part. Suppose not, there is an odd party. By definition, the odd 
party is constituted by an strict odd ring R, which is unique in our restricted 
doiiiain, with condition (2) satisfied in definition 5b. Consider an initially un-
stable matching /i with agents inside the odd ring match with agents inside the 
odd ring, while agents outside the odd ring match with agents outside the odd 
ring. Since for any i G R and jeN —R, iij'^i — l = > j : i-l^i. Therefore, 
any pair (z, j ) cannot form a blocking pair. Hence the strict odd ring cannot be 
broken by choosing random blocking pairs and we have found a initially unsta-
ble matching /i for which any sequence of matchings originated from fi will be 
cyclic and nonconvergent. 
Remark Example 6 illustrates the "only if" part of the proof of theorem 3. 
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"If" part. Suppose not, random path does not converge. Then there must be 
a strict odd ring for the random path to be cyclic. By assumption, this odd ring 
is unique. Consider the set of odd-ring-free agents, the set admits some stable 
matchings as there is no odd ring and hence no odd party according to definition 
5a. Pick anyone of the stable matchings restricted to the set of odd-ring-free 
agents. By a result similar to proposition 2, either these matchings and the odd 
ring form a semi-stable partition (this proves the claim contrapositively), or 
we will find another convergent path (this contradicts our initial assumption). 
Hence our proof is established. This result is summarized in the lemma below. 
Lemma 2 Assume (i) an instance of roommate problem contains only a unique 
strict odd ring A = {ai, 02,... and (ii) B = N — {ai,a2,... has 
multiple stable matchings, then either A and B together form a semi-stable 
partition or random path is convergent. 
The idea of the proof is similar to proposition 2. The exceptions are that firstly, 
we allow the instance of roommate problem to admit a stable matching. This is 
needed because we are studying convergence in theorem 3. Secondly, we allow 
for the set of odd-ring-free agents to admit multiple stable matchings. 
Suppose A and B do not form a semi-stable partition, and random path 
does not converge. As in proposition 2，the crossing pair initiates a sequence 
of matchings. We have already shown that three kinds of contradictions will 
emerge: 
(1) The sequence of matchings converge to a stable matching. This contra-
dicts the assumption that random path does not convrge, as the initial matching 
specified in proposition 2 is unstable but it converges to some other matchings. 
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(2) The sequence of matchings lead to the formation of new odd ring, this 
also contradicts assumption (i) of the present lemma. 
(3) The sequence of matchings lead to another stable matching ,/restricted 
to the set of odd-ring-free agents. This does not lead to immediate contradiction 
of the lemma because we allow for multiple stable matchings in the set of odd-
ring-free agents. Yet we show that this stable matching together with the odd 
ring form a semi-stable partition. For us to reach contradiction (iii) in propo-
sition 2, the sequence of matching can only pass through process (bl),(b2) and 
(b4). When all the proposers are exhausted the sequence reaches a new stable 
matching in the set of odd-ring-free agents. Therefore, we only have to show 
that there is no crossing pair. Note that a crossing pair in this case involves an 
agent a from the strict odd ring, and either 6 or c from the set of odd-ring-free 
agents. By process (b4), the initial crossing pairs break up and all the living 
standard of fe. So the crossing pair cannot be in the form (a, h). cs play the 
role of proposers in our construction. They are matched with some bs but not 
any of the as. This reflects the fact that cs prefers bs to as when it is their 
turn to propose. So the crossing pair cannot be in the form (a, c) either. This 
argument verifies that odd ring A and matching /./,' form a semi-stable partition 
and contradict the initial assumption. 
With lemma 2，theorem 3 is proved. Thus, we have shown that no odd 
party in a semi-stable partition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
convergence of random-paths-to-stability. 
Finally, we document an earlier result when we were attempting to prove 
that no odd party in a semi-stable partition is sufficient for convergence. 
26 
Proposition 3 Let N = 3, and suppose there is only one weak ring, then 
there exists a stable matching and any random paths converge. Similarly, the 
proposition also holds for N = 4：. 
Proof See appendix. 
This essentially says that a weak ring loses its "trouble-making" ability in con-
sidering convergence result. However, this is more or less trivial as the presence 
of weak ring makes the problem relatively easier to handle. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we study the roommate problem with weak preferences. Fol-
lowing closely the work of Tan (1991) and Chung (2000)，we have extended 
the concept of stable partition to case of weak preferences. In particular, we 
have "stable partition" for studying existence and "semi-stable partition" for 
studying convergence. In a restricted domain of preference profiles, namely, 
preference profiles which contain a unique strict odd ring, we have shown that 
"no odd party" in a "stable partition" is sufficient for the existence of stable 
matchings and "no odd party" in a "semi-stable partition" is both necessary 
and sufficient for the convergence of random-paths-to-stability. Moreover we 
have found an important example, example 4, which illustrate that under our 
definition of "stable partition", "no odd party" is not a necessary condition for 
the existence with the presence of ties. Despite this and some other negative 
results, we have tried to reinterpret the notion of "stable partition" and shown 
that under some reasonable restrictions on preference profiles, "stable partition" 
exists in an instance of roommate problem. We understand that the present 
work is far from complete, still we contribute to the literature by providing 
some negative and illuminating examples and establishing some positive results 
in a restricted domain of preference profile. We believe that our first attempt 
in solving the problem would be useful for further exploration of this topic. 
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Appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We break the proof into two parts. In the first part, we consider only unique 
crossing pair and ring of size three. In the second part, we generalize the result 
to case with multiple crossing pairs and ring of size n. 
First part. 
In this part, we consider cases with an unique crossing pair and an odd ring of 
size three. Let the initial matching be /io = {(ai, 02,03), (61, Ci), (62, C2),…’ c^)}, 
where A = (ai, 02,03) is an odd ring, and Q) are roommates under "0 for 
i = 1, . . . ,n, that is, bi = //(q) and q = fj.{bi). Note that if bi = c“ then he is 
single. We assume that " = {(61, Ci)’（62，C2),. • •, c^)} is the unique stable 
matching restricted to B = N - {01,02,03}. 
We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose not, consider a unique 
crossing pair with ai e A and k e B such that ai \ hi >： a^-i and k : 
di ^ Ci. Other agents satisfy the conditions for stable partition. WLOG, 
let i — 1. After satisfying the crossing pair (ai，6i), the matching becomes 
{(ai, 61)’（(22，62), C I , ( 6 2，C 2 ) ’ . . .， ( f i n , Cn)}. If bi IS Single under ",0’ then Ci disap-
pears as 61 = Ci and we go to case (a). If bi is not single, then his roommate 
Ci is left single, then we go to case (b). The key of the proof is to show that 
no matter which case we have, we will find a contradiction. 
Case (a), bi is single under fi and this contradicts assumption (i) stable 
matching does not exist. 
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If bi is single under /i, then there will be a stable matching after satisfying 
(ai，6i). To see this, by stability of /i, fXb = {(62,02),..., is stable. 
Note that Ci disappears as 61 = ci is single. Also, Ha = {(ai, 61), (02, as)} is 
stable. To see this, notice that a： : 61 03, so (ai, as) cannot form a blocking 
pair. a2 : (23 — ai, so (a：,02) cannot form a blocking pair too. Since (61’<22) 
and {bi,as) are not crossing pair at the beginning, they cannot be a blocking 
pair of //-a as well. Hence /i^ is stable. Lastly, notice that there are no other 
crossing pair of A U {61} and B — {61} as we have assumed unique crossing pair. 
Therefore, if we put the above matchings fia and jib together, they will form a 
stable matching. This contradicts assumption (i). 
Case (b). 61 is not single under //，her partner Ci could propose to different 
type of agents, namely, agent who is single, nonsingle, agent in the odd ring, 
and agent in the initial crossing pair. We consider these in different cases (b.l), 
(b.2), (b.3), and (b.4) in turn. 
If bi is not single under /i, then Ci = jn(bi) will be left single after satisfying 
crossing pair (ai,bi). Subsequently, Ci becomes a proposer. We will show that 
if Ci proposes and forms a blocking pair with some agents, then we will find a 
contradiction. The exceptional case happens when Ci goes with agent who is 
not single under /j,, WLOG, call him 62, then 635 original partner C2 will become 
a new proposer. This process can repeat a lot of times, and in general we let 
Cfc to be the proposer at round k > l(i.e., after the above process has repeated 
k — 1 times.) Note that when we construct the proof, it suffices and is natural 
for us to require Ck to propose to his most-preferred roommate as this simplifies 
the following arguments by avoiding multiple choices of blocking pairs. 
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Consider proposal round k, there are three types of blocking pairs. 
( b . l ) Suppose Cfc goes with agent that is single in /i，say bm. Then from 
the analysis in case (a), ^a = {(<^1，W,(勿，“3)} is stable. Matching fib = 
{(Ci，62),...，(Cfc_i,6fc), (6fc+i，Cfc+i),. •.，(fin, Cn), (Cfc, bm)} is also stable. The rea-
son is that fi is stable, and the living standard of each pair (Q, 6^ +1), i = 
1，…，/c — 1, is higher compare to their ranking of mates under /i. As there 
is no more crossing pair, then fia and jii, form a stable matching if we put them 
together. This contradicts assumption (i). 
(b.2) Suppose Cfc goes with agent who is not single in "，WLOG, call him 
bk+i. Then c^+i is left single and becomes a new proposer. The formation of 
blocking pair (c^, b^^i) implies the following condition holds for all i = 1,…，k: 
bi+i : Ci >- Ci+i (ci is 6i+i’s superior) and 
Ci : bi >- bi+i (fii+i is Ci's inferior). 
We call this condition A. As point out above, the process (b.2) cannot repeat 
infinitely as the number of agents in fi is finite. Notice that if Ck is the current 
proposer, then step (b.2) must have repeated k — 1 times so that condition A 
holds for i =，1... , /c — 1. 
(b.3) Suppose Ck goes with agent in the odd ring. Since the odd ring contains 
three agents, there are three subcases to consider. We show that in each case, 
a contradiction is reached immediately. 
(b.3i) Ck blocks with ai. This implies the following condition holds: 
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ai ： Ck y bi y as and 
Ck :bk y ai. 
We call this condition B. We show that if this happens at any proposal round k, 
then R = (ai’ Cfc,、，...，Ci, 61) forms an odd ring. Since Ck is the proposer, this 
implies condition A is satisfied for alH = 1 , . . . , /c. Together with condition B, 
it is easy to verify R is an odd ring. That is, we have ai : Ck >- 61, Ck ： bk >- cli 
by condition B, and bk ： c^-i >~ Q：，Ck-\ ： hk-\ >- bk, and up to f)2 ： Ci >- c2, 
Ci : bi y 62 by repeatedly applying condition A for k times of (b.2) process. 
And 61 : tti ^ ci by the condition of crossing pair. It follows that R is an odd 
ring and this contradicts assumption (ii). 
(h.Sii) Ck blocks with a2. This implies we have condition (I2 Ck >• as and 
Ck ： bk >- 03. Matching iia — {(<^1’ 61)，(<^ 2，oO, 03} is stable. To see this, note 
that ai : bi >- as as (ai, 61) is a crossing pair, so (ai, as) cannot form a blocking 
pair. Given the condition a2 ： Ck a^  >- ai, (ai,a2) and (02,as) cannot be 
blocking pairs too. Moreover, (ai, Cfc) and (61’ a2) cannot be blocking pairs as 
well, if otherwise, they will be crossing pair at the beginning. Finally (61, Ck) 
cannot be a blocking pair, if this is the case, it means Ck ： h >- as, so Ck should 
have proposed to hi instead of a .^ But this is exactly case (b.4) below. It shows 
that this is not possible. Since there is no more proposer in S — U {61, c^；}), 
matching = {(Ci’ >^2)，.. • ， ( 6 ^ + 1 , 0 ^ + 1 ) , • •., (K, c^)} is stable by the 
stability of fi and by the higher living standard of each (q, 6终1)， i = i,... ,k-l, 
compare to the standard in fi. So putting fia and /i^  together, they will form a 
stable matching. This contradicts assumption (i). 
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(b.3m) Ck blocks with 03. Then restricted to A U {61, c/c} is a matching 
fia = {(ai, 61), a2, (a3，Cfc)}. Similar to case (b.3ii), fia is stable since (a — 1,61) 
is a crossing pair, ai : bi ^ as, so (ai,as) cannot be a blocking pair. Given c^  
blocks with 03, a^  : c^  y a2, so (02, a^) cannot be a blocking pair. If a： : 61 ^ 02, 
then ((21,(22) cannot form a blocking pair too. Similarly, blocking pair (c^, bi) 
leads us to case (b.4). Hence � i s stable. Putting fia and fib in case (b.2ii) 
together, they form a stable matching and this contradicts assumption (i). 
Otherwise, if ai : a2 >- 61, we show that R = (ai, 02,03, c^, . . . , Ci, 61) is 
an odd ring. We have ai : <22 bi by our assumption. Then a2 ： a^  >- ai by 
odd ring condition. 03 : c^ >- a�given the present case with Ck blocks with a .^ 
It follows that Ck ： bk >- a^  diS a^ is inferior of Ck and they are not crossing pair 
at the beginning, hk ： Ck-i >- Ck by the (b.2) process, and repeated application 
of condition A leads to bi+i : q >~ q+i and Ci : bi >- 6^ +1, for z = 1 , . . . , fc — 1. 
Lastly, 61 : ai ^ Ci as (ai, 61) is a crossing pair. It follows that R is an odd ring 
and this contradicts assumption (ii). 
(b.4) Finally we consider a case in which the proposer blocks with the 
agent of the initial crossing pair, that is, Ck goes with 61. In this case, we have 
bi : Ck y ai y Ci, so Ck is 61 ’s superior, therefore, bi must be c^'s inferior. This 
implies Ck ： bk bi. Since c^ is the proposer, condition A applies k — 1 times, 
it is easy to see that {ck, bk, c^-i, 6fc-i,.. •, ci, 6i) forms an even ring. Therefore 
there are two stable matchings among these agents this contradicts assumption 
(iii)-
Second Part. 
In the second part, we consider the general case with multiple crossing pairs 
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and an unique odd ring of arbitrary size. The structure of the proof is similar 
to the first part. Let the initial matching be 
A^o 二 (ai,. •.，^ in), 
(M) ’ (M) ’ . . . , ( e c j^))， 
where A = (ai , . . . ,a^) is an odd ring of arbitrary size n, with n is odd. Pairs 
力,c[^ ))，for i,j = 1,... ,n are roommates under the initial matching, that is 
= 力)and c^ p = Note that if h^ p = cp), then he is single. 
We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose not, there are multiple 
crossing pairs, with aj G A and b�p G B such that cij : 匕 aj-i and : 
CLj ^ for j = 1 , . . . WLOG, let i = 1. Preferences of other agents 
satisfy the conditions for stable partition. After satisfying the crossing pairs 
⑷，/4"))j=i”..,„’ the matching becomes 
(«1，6門’41)，(6^),...,(祝1))， 
(a2，6f))，42)’(^42)’42)),...,(6Ac42))， 
，…,K,們)，4".)，(6 化 4 " ) ) , … , ( e ) , 
It follows that each c(/), j = 1，...，n become a proposer. The key of the proof 
is to show that no matters who the proposer blocks with, then we will be able 
to find a contradiction. Just like the first part, we have two cases to consider. 
Case (a). Each Ci^ proposes to agents with superscript j only. It follows 
that after a finite sequences of proposals, we will be able to find a contradiction 
and our claim follows from the first part of the proof dircctly. The idea is that 
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each j indexes a particular matching /ij = c--^ )^}. Each iij is conceptu-
ally the same as /z in proposition 2. The present case with multiple crossing 
pairs means that the unique stable matching can be written as a collection of 
{"j}j=i’...’n- When proposer c(/) does not propose to agent outside 約，then this 
is equivalent to n cases of proposition 2. 
Case (b). Each 4力 may propose to agents outside " j . To show that there 
is a contradiction, we adopt the following proposal rule. WLOG, we let c^) 
proposes first. In the proposal process, either a new proposer is generated, for 
example, c^ 】）blocks with bg) for any j , then is left single and becomes a 
new proposer. If this is the case, then we let to become a new proposer 
in the process. If there is not any new proposal generated, then we let c f ) to 
be a new proposer. Note that it is possible for to block with c[2)，then we 
let 43) to be the proposer, so forth and so on until we exhaust all the possible 
propospers. 
By the argument above, we let cp) to be a proposer in general and there 
is a set of possible proposers. Again, there are three types of blocking pairs 
as the proposer could propose to agent who is single, nonsingle, agent in the 
odd ring, or agent in the initial crossing pair. They are examined below in case 
(b.l)，(b.2),(b.3)，and (b.4) in turn 
(b.l) Suppose goes with agent who is single in any of the fij or agent 
in the set of possible prospers. Since no new agent will be left single under 
this case, hence no new proposer is generated. We pick an agent in the set of 
possible proposers to play the role of proposer. Notice that the size of the set 
of possible proposers reduces one. Hence case (b.l) cannot repeat infinitely as 
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the size of the set of possible proposers is finite, it will eventually reduce to an 
empty set. In that case, we have found a stable matching and this contradicts 
assumption (i). 
(b.2) Suppose goes with agent who is not single in fik for some k. 
For notational convenience, we call this guy 6 . Then is left single and 
becomes a new proposer. The formation of the blocking pair (c^, implies 
the following condition holds: 
hf^ ^ : c!)�—c!么{c^p is superior) and 
: — b ( 忍 i s cp)，s inferior). 
We call this condition 1. Similarly, the process (b.2) cannot repeat infinitely 
as the number of agents is finite and in each step, and the living standard for 
the agents involved in the blocking pairs rises. Notice that if cp) is the current 
proposer, then the step (b.2) must have repeated i — 1 times for some sequences 
of j , k. 
(b.3) Suppose goes with agent in the odd ring. Assume that proposes 
to ai for some I in the odd ring. This implies the following condition holds: 
ai : cP >- bi^  y a/_i and 
cp) ： h ai 
We call this condition 2. We will show that either there is an odd ring or a 
stable matching. First, we show that it is possible to find another odd ring 
other than A. Since is the current proposer, then step (b.2) must have 
repeated i — 1 times so condition 1 applied for all i = 1’...，i - 1 and some 
j, k. If this (b.2) process starts with agent c(i— in the set of possible proposers, 
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then we can verify that R = (a^, a m + i , … c [ ^ ) ， . . . , 4爪）’ is an odd 
ring if (i)am ： am+i h 爪）• We have 爪）:a^ ^ c^ m) by the crossing pair 
assumption. Preference for c(i爪）to satisfy the ring definition because of 
condition 1 applied for z — 1 times for some j, k . In addition to condition 2 and 
conditions for A to be an odd ring, it is easy to see that R is an odd ring and 
this contradicts assumption (ii). 
If otherwise (ii) am ： >- a爪+i，after satisfying the blocking pairs, we 
can take a matching {(4爪)’ 6约，…，(c!力’ a j } for some sj. This matching is 
stable because each b won't propose to b since by step (b.2), each of the living 
standard of b have increased. Otherwise, they would have blocked the initial 
unique stable matching. If (c, b), (c, c) and (c, a) form a blocking pair, since c is 
a proposer, c would have proposed to these agents at the beginning rather than 
the current partner by the construction. So this is not possible. Therefore the 
above matching is stable. Then the argument goes to the part (c). 
(b.4) In this case, the proposer blocks with agent in the initial crossing 
pairs. Suppose c^ ^ goes with b[ for some 1. Similar to case (b.3) above, if the 
(b.2) process starts with agent c(i爪）in the set of possible proposers, then after 
satisfying the blocking pairs, we can take a matching { (4—’ 括各)),….，时))} 
for some sequence of index number m, s,j. This matching is stable because 
each b won't propose to b since by step (b.2), each of the living standard of b 
have increased. Otherwise, they would have blocked the initial unique stable 
matching. If (c, b) and (c, c) form a blocking pair, since c is a proposer, c would 
have proposed to these agents at the beginning rather than the current partner 
by the construction. So this is not possible. Therefore the above matching is 
stable. Again this cannot repeat infinitely because the number of agent of form 
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bi \ I — 1, . . . , n is finite. Then the argument goes to the part (c). 
Case (c). Finally we consider this case because in some of the above cases, 
we have not reached contradiction immediately. Rather if the sequence of match-
ings goes through these cases, we can impose more conditions on the preference 
profile and verify that another odd ring exists or stable matching exists. In 
other words, some assumptions are violated. 
If the case (b.3)(ii) or (b.4) happen, then we will be able to find some 
matching as specified in case (b.3)(ii) and (b.4). Notice that after the process 
(b.3)(ii), the pair (az’c[^)) is satisfied and bi^  is left single. We add him to the 
set of proposers and call him …When it is his turn to propose, he runs the 
proposal process as above. But in process (b.3), c(广)，for / = 1,... cannot 
propose to ai since otherwise, we would have an odd ring before (a/, bf^) broke 
up. Moreover, process (b.3)(ii) cannot repeated infinitely because each time it 
happens, the living standard of ai rises, and given the preference list is of finite 
length, process (b.3)(ii) must stop at some point. 
We repeat the above proposal process until the set of possible proposers 
become empty. The process may pass through (b.l), (b.2) again and we have 
some new proposer and the process repeats. If the process passes through 
(b.3)(i), then we have contradiction immediately. If it again passes through 
step (b.3)(ii) and (b.4), we will be able to find a set of matchings. These 
matchings may overlap because two different c may propose to the same b. If 
this is the case, we let b to go with the c he most preferred. This cannot repeated 
infinitely because the preference list of b is of finite length. We have two cases, 
either the process passes through (b.3)(ii) or not. If it does not, then only (b.4) 
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happen and after it exhaust all the 6(/)，s, the matching it generated will be 
stable with respect to agents in B = N — A. This contradicts the assumption 
(iii). If instead, the process passes through both (b.3)(ii) and (b.4), and after 
exhausting all the possible proposers, we will reach a stable matching. This 
contradicts assumption (i). • 
Example 1 for proposition 1. 
Let the initial matching be " � = {(1’ 2，3)，（4’ 5), (6，7), (8,9), 10}, where (1，2，3) 
is an odd ring, and ji = {(4,5), (6,7), (8,9), 10} is the unique stable matching 
restricted to B = N - {1,2,3}. 
Suppose not, then there is a unique crossing pair a e A and b e B such that 
a : 6 ^ a — 1 and b : a^ fj,{b). WLOG, let a = 1. 
Case (a).If b is single under /x, e.g., b = 10, then P admits a stable matching 
after satisfying (1,10). We have {(1,10)，（2,3)}，which is stable since 1 is not 
going with 3 as 1 : 10 匕 3 and even if 1 : 2 10, 2 is not going with 1 as 
2 : 3 h 1 by odd ring condition. By stability of {(4,5), (6,7), (8,9)} is also 
stable. Therefore if we put the above matchings of ^ U {10} and B — {10} 
together. This contradicts the assumption. 
Case (b).If b is not single under ji, e.g., 6 = 4, then ^{h) = 5 will be left 
single after satisfying crossing pair (1,4). If there is no blocking pair, then 
as in case (a), = {(1,4), (2,3), 5, (6,7), (8,9), 10} is a stable matching and 
contradicts the assumption. If there is any blocking pair, we show that one 
of the assumptions will be violated. Note that if there is any blocking pair, it 
must involve ii{h) = 5, since as in case (a), {(1,4), (2,3)} is stable by odd ring 
conditions, and {(6，7), (8，9)，10} is stable by stabiility of fi. Therefore /i(6) = 5 
must be involved in the blocking pair. 
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Let 5 be a proposer. Possibly there are multiple blocking pairs, we requie 
5 proposes to his most-preferred roommate. This simplifies the following argu-
ments by avoiding multiplicity of blocking pairs. 
There are three types of blocking pairs. 
(b.l) Suppose 5 goes with agent that is single in "，i.e., the blocking pair 
is (5,10). Then easy to see that {(1,4), (2,3), (5,10), (6,7), (8,9)} is a stable 
matching. This contradicts the assumption. 
(b.2) Suppose 5 goes with agent who is not single in …e.g., the blocking pair 
could be (5,6), then the matching becomes, {(1,4), (2,3), (5,6), 7, (8,9), 10}. 
Hence agent 7 replaces the role of 5 and becomes a proposer now. This goes to 
process (c). 
(b.3) Suppose 5 goes with agent in the ring, since the ring contains three 
agents, there are three cases to consider. 
(b.3i) 5 blocks with a = 1. Then restricted to A U {4, 5} is a matching 
{(1，5)，（2’ 3), 4}. We have 1 : 5 4 ^ 3 and 5 : 4 1 ：^  5 by the assumption of 
present case and (1,5) is not a blocking pair of /xq- And since (1,4) blocks /i。， 
4 : 1 ^ 5 , thus (1,5,4) forms an odd ring, contradicts assumption (ii). 
(b.3ii) 5 blocks with a + 1 = 2. Then restricted to A U {4,5} is a match-
ing {(1,4), (2, 5), 3}. This is a stable as 1 : 4 ^ 3, so (1,3) is not a blcok-
ing pair. 2 : 5 ^ 3 1, so (1,2) is not a blocking pair even if 1 : 2 >-
4. As in case (a), by stability of ji, {(6,7), (8,9), 10} is stable. Therefore 
{(1,4)，(2,5), 3, (6,7), (8,9), 10} is a stable matching, contradicting assumption 
� . 
(b.Siii) 5 blocks with a — 1 = 3. Then restricted to A U {4，5} is a matching 
{(1,4), 2’（3’ 5)}. We have 1 : 4 ^ 3 and 4 : 1 h 5 as (1,4) is a blocking pair of 
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"0. Also 3 ： 5 ^ 2 (as 5 blocks with 3), this implies 5 : 4 ^ 3 (as (1,4) is the 
unique blocking pair of /ZQ)- If 1 ： 2 ^ 4, then (1,2) will form a blocking pair 
and thus (1,2,3,5,4) is an odd ring, contradicts assumption (ii). Otherwise, if 
1 : 4 — 2’ then {(1，4), 2，（3’ 5)} is stable. Hence {(1’ 4), 2, (3’ 5), (6，7), (8,9), 10} 
is a stable matching, contradicts assumption (i). 
As the arguments above shown, if we have case (b.l) and (b.3), we can find 
contradictions. We shall show that for case (b.2), the above arguments as hold 
for 7 as a proposer. 
For case (b.2), now 7 becomes a proposer. And the starting matching is 
AX2 = {(1,4),(2,3),7, (5，6)，(8，9)，10} 
(c.l) As in case (b.l) if 7 proposes to 10，then (7,10) blocks fi) and we 
have a stable matching {(1,4), (2,3), (5,6), (7,10), (8,9)} , which contradicts 
assumption (iii). 
(c.2) Suppose 7 goes with agent who is not single, e.g., the blocking pair 
could be (7,8), then "2 is blocked by matching {(1，4)，(2,3), (5，6), (7，8), 9,10}. 
Hence agent 8 replaces the role of 7 and becomes a proposer now. 
(c.3) Suppose 7 goes with agent in the ring, since the ring contains three 
agents, there are three cases to consider. This process will stop at shown at the 
last of the proof. 
(c.3i) 7 blocks with a = 1. Then restricted to ^ U {4,7} is a matching 
{(1,7), (2’ 3)，4}. We have 1 : 7 ^ 4 b 3 and 7 : 6 ^ 1 5 by the assumption of 
present case and (1, 7) is not a blocking pair of fio. Also (1,5) is not a blocking 
pair of fio, and by stability of /i, 5 : 4 6 1 and 6 : 5 ：^  7. And since (1,4) 
blocks Mo, 4 : 1 ^ 5, thus (1，7，6’ 5,4) forms an odd ring, contradicts assumption 
(ii). 
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(c.3ii) 7 blocks with a + 1 = 2. Then restricted to A U {4, 7} is a matching 
{(1,4), (2,7)，3}. This is a stable as 1 : 4 ^ 3, so (1,3) is not a blcoking 
pair. 2 : 7 ^ 3 >- 1, so (1,2) is not a blocking pair even if 1 : 2 4. Also 
{(5’ 6), (8’ 9), 10} is stable. Therefore {(1，4), (2，7), 3, (5，6), (8,9), 10} is a stable 
matching, contradicting assumption (i). 
(c.3iii) 7 blocks with a - 1 = 3. Then restricted to ^ U {4,7} is a matching 
{(1,4), 2, (3,7)}. We have 1 : 4 ^ 3 and 4 : 1 ^ 5 as (1,4) is a blocking pair 
of /iQ. Also 6 : 5 ^ 7 (as 5 blocks with 6), this implies 5 : 4 6 5 (by 
stability of ")• Moreover, 3 : 7 ^ 2 (as(3,7) is a blocking pair), this implies 
7 : 6 — 3 (as (1,4) is the unique blocking pair of /iQ. With (1,2,3) as odd 
ring, 2 : 3 ^ 1 . If 1 : 2 ^ 4, then (1,2) will form a blocking pair and thus 
(1，2，3，7，6,5，4) is an odd ring, contradicts assumption (ii). Otherwise, if 1 : 4 >-
2, then {(1,4), 2, (3，7), (5,6)} is stable. Hence {(1，4)，2, (3，7), (5,6)，(8,9), 10} 
is a stable matching, contradicts assumption (i). 
An additional issue here is (4,7) is a possible blocking pair of ii2- If this 
is the case, it must be that 4 : 7 ；^  1 b 5 and 7 : 6 1 7 (by stability 
of II. But for us to reach 时,as in case (c.Siii), we have 5 : 4 6 5 and 
6 : 5 ^ 7 . Then restricted to agents in B, we can find two stable matchings: 
{(4,5), (6, 7), (8,9), 10} and {(5,6), (4, 7), (8,9), 10}. In the former one, 5 and 
7 get their most-preferred agents, so (4,7) and (5,6) cannot be blocking pairs. 
For the latter one, 4 and 6 get their most-preferred agent, so (4，5) and (6,7) 
cannot be blocking pairs. This contradicts the assumption that /i is the unique 
stable matching in B. 
We can see that the arugments above always reach contradiction immediately 
except in case (b.2) and (c.2) because the proposer blocks the matching with 
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an agent with partner in B, so after they are satisfied, a new proposer will 
appear. However, because the number of agents in B is finite and after each 
pair is satisfied, one of the agent must have found a better partner, so his 
standard will be raised, therefore the process must stop. This process rematches 
agents in B — {4}, when it stop, it means we have another stable matching 
in B - {4}. Together with {(1,4), (2,3)}, they form a stable matching, this 
contradicts assumption (i). Otherwise, the proposal process must pass through 
case other than (b.2) and (c.2), which we have shown above that there will be 
contradictions. • 
Example 2 for proposition 1. 
Let the initial matching be ",o = {(1,2,3), (4,5), (6,7), (8,9), 10,11,12}, where 
(1,2,3) is an odd ring, and /x = {(4,5), (6,7), (8,9), 10,11,12} is the unique 
stable matching restricted to B = N — {1,2,3}. This particular example allows 
us to exhaust all the possibilities. 
Suppose not, A and B do not form a stable partition. Assume there are 
multiple crossing pairs, (ai, bi) and (a2,62), with ai, 02 G A and 61,62 G B, such 
that CLi : bi t ai-i and bi : ai t “(fii), z = 1,2. 
Notice that proposition 2 is a special case of the present proposition with 
ai = and bi = 62. If ai = 02 = a, WLOG, we let a : bi >- 62. Or if bi = b] = b, 
WLOG, we let b : ai >- 02- Then these cases reduce to proposition 2 with a 
unique proposer. 
Case (a). If both bi and 62 are single, for example 61 = 10 and 62 = 11，then 
there is a matching {(1，10)，(2,11), 3, (4,5)，(6,7), (8,9), 12} after satisfying the 
crossing pairs. Matching restricted to B- {10 ,11 } , that is, {(4,5), (6,7), (8,9), 12} 
is stable by the stability of //.. Also matching restricted to AU {10,11} is stable. 
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The reasons are that, firstly, 10 won't propose to 2,3 and 11 won't propose to 
1,3 as they are not blocking pairs in fi. Also if (10，11) forms a blocking pair, 
then they block /i too as now their living standard has risen. Secondly, we have 
1 ： 10 3 and 2 : 11 1 as implied by the condition of crossing pairs. It follows 
that 1 won't propose to 3 and if 1 propose to 2, 2 won't leave 11. Thus no block-
ing pair would involve 1. Lastly，it is obvious that 2 won't propose to 1, and if 
2 : 3 — 11, then (2,3) could form a blocking pair, but then {(1,10), (2,3), 11} 
is stable. Therefore either {(1’ 10), (2，11), 3}is stable or {(1,10)，（2，3)，11} is 
stable. 
We also have to check whether 3 proposes to agents in B — {10,11}. We 
call this part of proof case (*). If not, we have found a stable matching already, 
contradicting assumption (i). If so there must exist a stable matching for the 
agents in [B — {10,11}) U 3 since there is no odd ring contained in it. Together 
with {(1，10), (2，11)}，they form a stable matching, which also contradicts as-
sumption (i). Notice that in the subsequent cases, 3 could also be a proposer 
when 1 and 2 go with some other agent. We will recall case (*) for completing 
those parts of proof. 
Case (b). If either bi or 62 is single, for example, let 61 = 4 and 62 = 10, then 
we have a matching {(1,4), (2,10), 3,5, (6，7)，（8’ 9)，11,12} after satisfying the 
crossing pairs. Similar to case (a), we will show that for the matching restricted 
to agents in A U {4,10}’ either {(1,4), (2,10), 3} or {(1，4), (2，3), 10} is stable. 
The proof is symmetric to case (a). Firstly, 4 won't propose to 2,3 and 10 won't 
propose to 1,3 as they are not blocking pairs in Also their living standard 
is now higher, if (4,10) forms a blocking pair, then this implies they would 
have blocked fi and contradicts stability of /i. Secondly, we have 1 : 4 ^ 3 
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and 2 ： 10 ^ 1 as implied by the condition of crossing pairs. It follows that 1 
won't propose to 3 and if 1 propose to 2, 2 won't leave 10. Thus no blocking 
pair would involve 1. Lastly, it is obvious that 2 won't propose to 1, and if 
2 : 3 — 10, then (2,3) could form a blocking pair, but then {(1,4), (2,3), 10} is 
stable. Therefore either {(1’ 4)，(2,10), 3}is stable or {(1,4)，(2,3), 10} is stable. 
Now since 5 = "(4) is left single, then he becomes a proposer. If 5 does not 
propose to agent in AU {4,10}, then the proof follows directly from proposition 
2 with 5 as a unique proposer. The only difference between the present case 
and proposition 2 is that we have multiple crossing pairs now. We have to 
check whether 5 block with 10. If so, matching {(1,4), (2,3), (5,10)} is stable 
from the above arguments. And matching {(6,7), (8,9), 11,12} is stable by the 
stability of /x. And there is no more proposer and thus no more crossing pairs. 
Putting these two matchings together, then we have found a stable matching, 
which contradicts assumption (i). 
Lastly, if 3 proposes to agents in B — {A, 10}, we could find a stable matching 
too as there is no odd ring contained in it. The proof of this part follows from 
case (*). 
Case (c). Suppose both agents bi and 62 are not single, for example, 61 = 4 
and 62 = 6, then the matching will be {(1,4)，(2’ 6), 3,5,7, (8，9), 10，11，12} after 
satisfying the crossing pairs. In this case, there are multiple proposer, namely 
5 and 7. We shall show that no matter which agent proposes first, there will be 
contradiction. 
Let agent 5 be the proposer at the moment. We have to consider four cases. 
(c.i). 5 goes with agent who is single in say 10，11,12，then we will have 7 
as the sole proposer. Then the remaining proof follows from case (b) with only 
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one proposer. 
(c.ii). 5 goes with agent who is not single in fi, say 8，then 9 will replace the 
role of 5 and become a new proposer. If this is the case, the proof goes back 
to the beginning of part (c) with two proposers. Yet case (c.ii) cannot repeat 
infinitely as the number of agents in jL is finite. For example, in our present 
example, after (5,8) forms a blocking pair, there is matching {(5，8), 7,9,11,12}, 
and there is no agent who is not single in original /x. Note that 9 cannot go 
back with 8，and at most we can have 7 blocks with 8 with 5 becomes the new 
proposer. But in that case 5 cannot go back with 8 either. So (c.ii) process 
must stop at finite step. 
(ciii). 5 goes with another proposer, i.e., 7, then we have reached a new 
matching {(1,4), (2,6), 3, (5,7), (8,9), 10,11,12} immediately. Together with 
proof of case (*), we must be able to reach a stable matching. This contra-
dicts assumption (i). 
(c.iv). 5 goes with agent in A U {4,6}. There are 5 sub-cases to consider, 
(c.iv.l). 5 goes with 1. It follows that 1 : 5 ^ 4 and this implies 1 is 5，s 
inferior in / / � ’ that is, 5 : 4 1. (1,4) as a crossing pair implies 4 : 1 匕 5, then 
R = (1, 5,4) is an odd ring. This contradicts assumption (ii). 
(c.iv.2). 5 goes with 2. The matching {(1，4), (2，5), 3’ 6，7，(8,9), 10，11’ 12} is 
reached. By stability of matching {(6，7), (8，9), 10,11，12} is stable. If 3 does 
not block with anyone in {(1,4)(2,5)}, then we have found a stable matching. 
This contradicts assumption (i). 
(c.iv.3). 5 goes with 3. The matching {(1’ 4), (2，6)，（3，5), 7, (8，9), 10，11,12} 
is reached. Then 7 becomes the sole proposer and the remaining proof follows 
from proposition 2 
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(c.iv.4) 5 goes with 6. It follows that 6 : 5 2 ^ 7 and this implies 4 is 5's 
inferior, that is, 5 : 4 ：^  6. Given (1,4) and (2,6) are crossing pairs, 4 : 1 ^ 5 
and 2 : 6 ^ 1 . If 1 : 2 ^ 4, then there will be an odd ring R = (1,2,6,5,4). 
This contradicts assumption (ii). Otherwise, we have 1 : 4 ；^  2. It follows that 
{(1,4)(2, 3)(5,6), 7’（8，9)，10,11，12} is a stable matching. And this contradicts 
assumption (i). 
(c.iv.5) Lastly, 5 may propose to 4，but obviously, 4 : 1 匕 5, so (4,5) cannot 
be a blocking pair. 
If instead we select 7 to be the proposer at the beginning of case (c), then 
7 will replace the role of 5 and the proof is completely symmetric because the 
position of 5 and 7 is symmetric in matching /z, i.e., they are both matched with 
some agents in /i. 
As a result, if we assume that the proposition does not hold, then there 
will be some crossing pairs and some proposers. And we have shown in all the 
possibilities that no matter which agent is going to form a blocking pair with 
the proposer, we will either find a contradiction or go some steps further and 
find a contradiction later. This proves that stable partition does exist under 
our restrictions. • 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Let the ring be = (1，2，3). For existence, there are two cases to consider: 
Case (1). 1 : 3 � 1 . There exists a stable matching ijl = [(2,3), 1]. Observe 
that 2 does not want to deviate as it must be 2 : 3 1 for to be a ring, and 
{1 ,3} cannot block ji due to indifference. So there is no blocking pair and ji is 
stable. 
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Case (2). 1 ： 2 � 3 . There exists a stable matching ji = [(1,3), 2], Observe 
that 3 does not want to deviate as it must be 3 : 1 2 for i? to be a ring, and 
{1, 2} cannot block fi due to indifference. So there is no blocking pair and /i is 
stable. 
For convergence, if i? is a strict ring, then if single matching (i.e. /j, = [1,2,3' 
is unstable, then any sequence of matchings must pass through (^i, 112, -OJ 
where fii = [(1,2),3], "2 = [(2，3)’1]，and "3 = [(1,3),2], and Ms form a 
cycle. As shown above for case (1) and (2)，the cycle will be broken as one of 
the matching will become stable when there is indifference, i.e., when the ring 
is weak. 
For the second part of the proposition, let N = 4：. Let the ring be R = 
(1,2,3). Since we have only one ring and compare to case with iV = 3’ we have 
an additional agent 4. 4 could have two roles. 
If 4 is not a ring breaker, i.e., for all i e R, either l : 3 ) > - 4 o r 4 : 4 ; ^ l , 
then adding 4 does not lead to new stable matching. The proof is the same as 
proposition 1. 
If 4 is a ring breaker, i.e., there is s^ni e R such that 1 : 3 ^ 4 and 4 : 1 ^ 4 . 
Adding 4 may lead to new stable matching. We consider different cases as 
follows.Case 1. 1 : 2 � 3 
la. When 4 is I's superior. 
If 4 : 1 — 4 and 1 : 4 — 3，then matching /ii = [(1,4), (3,2)] is stable. To 
see this, notice that 3 does not want to deviate as 3 is 2’s most preferred agent, 
and {3，1} cannot form a blocking pair as 1 : 4 卜 3. Hence /jLi is stable. 
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Convergence paths look like: 
[1,2,3,4]丨(1，2)’3’4] — [(3,4), 1,4] — [(1,3),2,4] — [(1,4),3,2]— 
[(1,4), (3,2)1=^1 
If 4 : 1 � 4 o r 1 : 4 � 3 , then there is an additional matching = 
(3,1), 2，4]. Since by assumption {1,4} cannot form a blocking pair. Also, 3 
does not want to devaite as 1 is his most preferred agent. Hence 1^ 2 is stable. 
Convergence paths look like: 
[1,2,3,4] 4 [(1,2),3,4] — [(3,2), 1,4] — [(1,3), 2,4] = or 
[(1,4)’3，2]4[(1,4)’(3，2)]=/zi 
lb. When 4 is 2 or 3's superior. WLOG, consider 2. 
If 4 : 2 4 and 2 : 4 ；^  2，then matching "3 = [(2,4)，（1,3)] is stable. To see 
this, note that 3 does not want to deviate as 1 is 3's most preferred agent. And 
since 2 ： 4 )>- 1, so {1,2} cannot form a blocking pair. Hence JI3 is stable. 
Convergence paths look like: 
[1,2,3,4] — [(1,2), 3,4] — [(2,3), 1,4] — [(2,4), (1,3)] =/^a, or 
[1,2,3’ 4] — [(2’ 4)，1,3] — 1(2,4), (1,3)] = A^s 
If 4 : 2 � 4 or 2 : 4 � 1， t h e n there is an additional stable matching 
fi4 = [(2,3), 1,4]. Since 3 does not want to deviate and {1,2} cannot form a 
blocking pair as 4 : 2 � 4 . Hence im is stable. 
Convergence paths look like: 
[1’ 2,3,4] — [(1,2),3,4] — [(2’ 3), 1，4] — [(1，3)，2,4] = /m, and 
[1,2，3,4] [(2,4), 1’ 3] — [(2，4), (1,3)] = /X3 
Case 2. 1 : 3 � 1 
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2a. When 4 is I's superior. 
If 1 : 4 � 3 and 4 : 1 4, then there is stable matching jii = [(1,4)(3,2)'. 
To see this, note that 2 does not want to deviate as 3 is 2，s most preferred agent 
and as 1 : 4 ；^  3, so {1,3} cannot block ",i’ hence ",1 is stable. 
Under these conditions, convergence paths look like: 
[1,2，3,4] [(1’ 4)，3，2] 4 [(1’ 4), (3’ 2)] = A^ I，or 
[1,2,3,4] 4 [(1,2),3’4] — [(2,3), 1,4] — [(1，4)(2’3)] = "1 
and if we start with another unstable matching, the paths look like: 
[(1’ 3), 2，4] 4 [(1,4), 2，3] — [(1，4)，(2’ 3)] = Mi, or 
[(1,3),2,4] — [(1,2), 3,4] — [(2，3)，1,4] — [(1，4)(2，3)] = im 
The above paths pass through all the possible matchings of this preference 
profile, therefore no matter which initial matchings we start with, random-path 
converges to stable matching ni. 
If either 1 : 4 � 3 or 4 : 1 �4， then there is an additional stable matching 
"2 = [(2,3), 1,4] since by assumption {1,4} cannot be blocking pair. The 
remaining argument for stability is the same as above. 
Under these conditions, convergence paths look like: 
[1’ 2,3’ 4] — [(1，4), 2，3] — [(1，4)，(2,3)] 二 "1，or 
[1，2，3，4] — [(1，2)，3’ 4] — [(2’ 3), 1’ 4])] = 1x2 
and if we start with another unstable matching, the paths look like: 
[(1,3), 2’ 4] — [(1,4), 2,3] 4 [(1，4)，(2,3)] = AM, or 
[(1,3), 2’ 4] -> [(1,2)，3’ 4] — [(2，3), 1,4] = /Z2 
The above paths pass through all the possible matchings of this preference 
profile, therefore no matter which initial matchings we start with, random-path 
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converges to stable matching or "2. 
2b. When 4 is 2 or 3's superior. WLOG, consider 2. 
If 2 ： 4 1 and 4 : 2 ；^  4，then matching "3 = [(1,3), (2,4)] is stable. To 
see this, notice that 1 is 3's most preferred agent, so he won't deviate. {1,2} 
cannot form a blocking pair as 2 : 4 1. Hence "3 is stable. There are two 
additional cases to consider: 
If condition (2b.1) 2 : 3 — 4 holds, then ",4 = [(2,3), 1,4]. By assumption, 
{1 ,3 } won't block /i4 as 1 : 3 � 1 and {1，2} won't block "4 too as 2 : 3 — 1. 
If condition (2b.2) 2 : 4 — 3 holds, then "5 = [(2,4), 1,3]. By assumption, 
{2 ,3} cannot be blocking pair. And {1,3} cannot block ",5 as 1 : 3 � 1 . 
Notice that the above preference restrictions are sufficient for existence of 
fM and //g, hence if 2 : 4 �3，then both jm and /15 are stable matchings. 
In this case, the convergence paths look like: 
under (2b. 1): 
[1，2，3’ 4] -> [(2，4)，1，3] 4 [(2，3)，1,4] = "4，or 
[(1，3), 2,4] — [(1，2)’ 3,4] — [(2，3)，1，4] == im or 
[(1，3),2，4卜[(3,4)(1’2)]="3. 
under (2b.2): 
[1，2’ 3，4] — [(1，2)，3’ 4] 4 [(2,3), 1’4] — [(2’4)，1,3] = /X5, or 
[(1,3)，2,4] [(1,2),3，4] [(2,3)，1，4] — [(2，4), 1,3] = ",5，or 
[(1，3)’2’4] — [(3，4)(1’2)]="3. 
Since the above paths pass through all possible matchings of this preference 
profiles, it means that if we start with any initial unstable matching, random-
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path converge to either 123, fM, or /Js depends on the preference restriction we 
have. 
For case with tie, i.e., if 4 : 2 � 3 ’ then /Z3 and /is are stable matchings. If 
(2b.1) we specified above does not hold, then "4 is also a stable matching. In 
this case, convergence paths look like: 
[1, 2，3，4] or [(1，3)，2, j] — [(1，2), 3，4] — [(2，3), 1,4] = "5，or 
(2,4), 1,3] [(2,3), 1,4] = ",5 if (2b.1) holds. Otherwise, the only way to 
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